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HELPING YOURSELF WHILE SERVING TWO 
MASTERS: DO SPECIALISTS VIOLATE RULE 
10B-5 WHEN THEY INTERPOSITION? 
Roman Asudulayev* 
ABSTRACT 
The decision of the Second Circuit in United States v. Finnerty 
(Finnerty III) was the culmination of a number of District Court 
decisions that found that specialists on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) could not be held liable for fraud under Rule 10b-5 for 
interpositioning, whereby they put themselves between buy and sell 
limit orders, in violation of NYSE rules, and profited on the spread.  
Finnerty III and its District Court sibling decisions were wrongly 
decided.  Specialists presented a uniquely thorny issue of agency law 
to the Federal Courts in New York.  This issue was under-analyzed by 
the Federal Prosecutors and left the courts without a coherent theory 
of fiduciary duty for specialists.  This Note will demonstrate that there 
is a fiduciary relationship between specialists and their public 
customers and will untangle that relationship to show that it prohibits 
interpositioning and that interpositioning was fraud under Rule 10b-
5. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With increasing public furor over the actions of various financial 
institutions,1 it is easy to forget that apparent fraud in finance can 
create tricky legal issues.  In 2005, federal prosecutors charged fifteen 
broker-dealers on the New York Stock Exchange, called 
“specialists,”2 with fraudulent trading.3  The gist of the charge was 
that the specialists took advantage of trade requests that clients had 
sent to them.4  Although specialists are allowed to trade on their own 
accounts, “when a buy order comes in at a higher price than a sell 
order, the specialist’s duty is to match the customers rather than 
profit from the spread.”5  The practice of profiting from the spread is 
called “interpositioning.”6  Between 2005 and 2008, the Federal 
 
 1. See, e.g., Populism: Will There Be Blood?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 2009, 
available at 2009 WLNR 5800671. 
 2. For a full definition of a specialist see infra, Part I.A. 
 3. See The New York Stock Exchange: Specialists Stumble, ECONOMIST, Apr. 
16, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 5924073. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. For a detailed discussion of interpositioning, see infra Part I.B and especially 
infra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
ASUDULAYEV_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2013  7:26 PM 
2012] WHEN SPECIALISTS INTERPOSITION 917 
Prosecutor for the Southern District of New York began fifteen 
prosecutions.7  All fifteen failed ignominiously8: seven were dropped 
voluntarily; two ended in acquittal;9 two guilty pleas were set aside; 
the government dropped a case against a fugitive;10 two had their 
convictions overturned by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals;11 and 
one individual, David Finnerty, had his conviction set aside by the 
District Court, and the Second Circuit upheld the decision.12  
Apparently, the government is quite unaccustomed to losing cases,13 
fifteen especially.  How did this fiasco occur? 
This Note will shed light on the operation of the NYSE, discuss the 
prosecutions, and explore the difficult legal questions they 
presented—questions that arguably have been left unanswered.  Part 
I of this Note introduces the reader to the NYSE and its specialists, 
explains interpositioning, discusses the background law that relates to 
specialists—SEC Rule 10b-5,14 fraud, and fiduciary duty—and 
explains some economic terminology that will later help put the role 
of specialists and interpositioning into perspective, and to consider 
this area of law from a more Legal Realist perspective. 
Part II of this Note will discuss the logic used by the courts in their 
ultimate rejection of the allegation of fraud against specialists for 
interpositioning: the courts did not receive a strong argument that 
specialists were fiduciaries of their clients, meaning that mere theft by 
the specialists without any express promises to the contrary could not 
be considered fraud.  Part II will also discuss the arguments that 
federal prosecutors put forth to show that the specialists were 
 
 7. The New York Stock Exchange: Specialists Stumble, supra note 3. 
 8. Dan Slater, More Specialists Prosecutions Sour, Southern District of NY 0-15, 
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Aug. 26, 2008, 9:34 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
law/2008/08/26/more-specialist-prosecutions-sour-southern-district-of-ny-now-0-15/. 
 9. Chad Bray & Paul Davies, Moving the Market: NYSE Ex-Floor Trader’s 
Conviction Thrown Out in Latest Blow to U.S.—District Judge Says Government 
Failed to Prove Deception, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2007, at C1. 
 10. Chad Bray, More Guilty Pleas Vacated in Probe of NYSE Trading, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 26, 2008, at C3. 
 11. United States v. Hayward, 284 F. App’x 857, 858 (2d Cir. 2008); Bray, supra 
note 10, at C3. 
 12. United States v. Finnerty (Finnerty II), 474 F. Supp. 2d 530, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007), aff’d, 533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008); Bray, supra note 10, at C3. 
 13. Paul Davies, Specialists Mark Rare Setback for U.S. Attorney—Decision to 
Drop Remaining Cases Against Elite NYSE Floor Traders Follows Series of 
Miscalculations, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2006, at C1.  A class action related to this 
subject matter is still ongoing. See, e.g., In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 260 F.R.D. 
55 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
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fiduciaries of their clients and that therefore their actions amounted 
to fraud. 
Part III of this Note explains that specialists play a negative role in 
the economy when they interpose themselves as traders between their 
customers, and therefore are an appropriate target for Rule 10b-5 
fraud prosecution.  Part III demonstrates how the arguments of the 
prosecution were correct in their conclusion but not in their 
reasoning, meaning that the courts were right to reject those 
arguments.  Part III concludes that specialists were agents of their 
clients because they were their brokers, who are agents of their clients 
to the extent of executing their clients’ trades.  As agents, these 
brokers had a fiduciary duty not to trade for their own benefit 
without their clients’ knowledge, as both a formal matter and by 
analogy to other legal doctrines. 
I.  THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF INTERPOSITIONING AND SOME 
ECONOMICS 
This Part discusses the background concepts and law behind the 
interpositioning prosecutions.  It defines the term “specialist”15 and 
the act of interpositioning.16  This Part also explains the relation of 
fraud under Rule 10b-5 to breaches of fiduciary duty generally.17  It 
then discusses two practices that are analogous to interpositioning: 
trading ahead18 and insider trading.19  This Part also offers a discussion 
of fiduciary duty, both in its inception20 and its operation.21  And, 
finally, it explains some economic terminology that shall be useful to 
understand the role that interpositioning plays in the financial 
system.22 
 
 15. See infra Part I.A. 
 16. See infra Part I.B. 
 17. See infra Part I.C. 
 18. See infra Part I.D.1. 
 19. See infra Part I.D.2. 
 20. See infra Part I.E.1. 
 21. See infra Part I.E.2. 
 22. See infra Part I.F.  For my analysis of interpositioning as an economic 
phenomenon, see infra Part III.A. 
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A. Specialists 
Specialists have a long history whose beginnings are obscured by 
legend.23  “In simplest terms,” George T. Simon and Kathryn M. 
Trkla describe the specialist as “a member of an exchange that 
specializes in trading a particular security or group of securities as 
broker or as dealer.”24  Thus, when a member of the public wants to 
buy a particular security at the NYSE, she must go through a 
specialist25 unless she trades electronically.  In other words, 
“[s]pecialists act as auctioneers in the specific stocks they are 
designated to trade.”26  Thus, part of the specialist’s role is to match 
up bids and offers,27 acting as a sort of “brokers’ broker,” taking 
orders from public customers’ brokers to buy or sell securities.28  
Generally, there are two kinds of orders that specialists take: market 
orders, which are orders to buy or sell a security at the market price, 
and limit orders, which are orders to buy or sell only if a certain price 
is available.29  Generally, a bid limit order will ask that a security be 
bought only when it is at or below a certain price, while an offer limit 
 
 23. J. Scott Colesanti, Not Dead Yet: How New York’s Finnerty Decision 
Salvaged the Stock Exchange Specialist, 23 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 1, 2–3 
(2008).  Note also that specialists are now called designated market makers, or 
DMMs. See NYSE, NEXT GENERATION MODEL 1 (2008)¸ available at 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/Next_Generation_Model.pdf.  However, this article will 
refer to them as ‘specialists’ since that is the term used by the courts that dealt with 
the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Finnerty (Finnerty III), 533 F.3d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 
2008) (“Appellee David Finnerty was a specialist at the New York Stock Exchange . . 
. .”). 
 24. George T. Simon & Kathryn M. Trkla, The Regulation of Specialists and 
Implications for the Future, 61 BUS. LAW. 217, 222 (2005). 
 25. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, A GUIDE TO THE NYSE MARKET PLACE 7 
(2d ed. 2006), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/nyse_bluebook.pdf (illustrating 
how a member of the public sells a security and the role that the specialist plays in the 
sale).  Other stock exchanges have specialists, too. See Simon & Trkla, supra note 24, 
at 222 (“The precise functions performed by specialists . . . vary based upon the 
characteristics of the exchange market in which they operate.”).  But because the 
prosecutions of specialists all dealt with NYSE specialists, the NYSE is the focus of 
this Note. 
 26. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 25, at 6. 
 27. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2007).  For the 
remainder of this Note, the terms ‘bid’ and ‘offer’ will have specific meanings.  A 
‘bid’ will describe an offer to buy a security at a certain price; an ‘offer’ (except as 
used within this definition) will describe an offer to sell a security at a certain price.  
Thus a bid price is the price at which the bidder is willing to buy a security; the offer 
price is the price at which the offeror is willing to sell that security. 
 28. Simon & Trkla, supra note 24, at 223. 
 29. 5 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION §14.13[1], at 364 
(6th ed. 2009). 
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order will ask that a security be sold only when it is at or above a 
certain price.30 
Yet, specialists also have a second function: they can buy and sell 
securities on their own accounts.31  Specifically, specialists may buy or 
sell securities when there are no matching orders.32  In other words, 
when there is a bid limit order that is too low for any existing offers, 
the specialist may take the opposite side of the bid, and sell at the bid 
price to prevent erratic market shifts.33  Another way to describe this 
function is to say that specialists provide liquidity to the market, by 
providing buyers or sellers for securities, when there would otherwise 
be an imbalance.34  In this capacity, specialists act as “market 
makers.”35  New York Stock Exchange Rule 104 prohibits specialists 
from trading on their own account as market makers unless there are 
no matchable customer orders.36  As a corollary, specialists are 
supposed to match orders at either the bid or offer price.37 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 405 F. Supp. 2d 281, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), 
rev’d on other grounds, 503 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 32. 5 HAZEN, supra note 29, at 342. 
 33. Id. at 342–43. 
 34. See In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 35. Specialists are not proper market makers because their primary function is not 
to trade on their own account, but rather to broker trades between other traders. Cf. 
5 HAZEN, supra note 29, at 310 (describing the role of market makers on “over the 
counter” exchanges); infra note 126.  Yet, specialists make a market insofar as they 
still act as counter-parties to traders who cannot find a market for a security that 
those traders would like to buy or sell. See 5 HAZEN, supra note 29, at 344 (noting 
that one of the duties of a specialist is to “manage supply and demand imbalances”). 
 36. Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d 530, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 533 F.3d 143 (2d 
Cir. 2008); 5 HAZEN, supra note 29, at 344–45; NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE RULE 
104T(a) (2013), available at http://nyserules.nyse.com/nysetools/PlatformViewer.asp 
?SelectedNode=chp_1_2&manual=/nyse/rules/nyse-rules/ (“No DMM [specialist] 
shall effect on the exchange purchases or sales of any security in which such DMM 
[specialist] is registered . . . unless such dealings are reasonably necessary to permit 
such DMM to maintain a fair and orderly market . . . .”); Bear Wagner Specialists, 
L.L.C., New York Stock Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 04-51, ¶¶ 29–30 (Mar. 29, 
2004), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/04-051.pdf; see also NEW YORK STOCK 
EXCHANGE RULE 476(a)(6) (2010), available at http://nyserules.nyse.com/ 
nysetools/PlatformViewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1_7&manual=/nyse/rules/nyse-
rules/ (making “failing to observe high standards of commercial honor and just and 
equitable principles of trade” a violation of the rules).  Note that the current Rule 
104T(a) was, at the time of the alleged violations, called Rule 104. See Bear Wagner, 
New York Stock Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 04-51, ¶ 30; NEW YORK STOCK 
EXCHANGE RULE 104 (2003) (“No specialist shall effect on the Exchange purchases 
or sales of any security in which such specialist is registered . . . unless such dealings 
are reasonably necessary to permit such specialist to maintain a fair and orderly 
market . . . .”).  Exchanges, such as the NYSE, are to be regulated by the Securities 
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Finally, specialists receive commissions for trades that they help 
broker.38  Interestingly, this fact was subject to some controversy: 
some of the courts specifically stated that specialists were not 
compensated by their clients through commission.39  This may be 
because the government appears to have conceded that specialists are 
not compensated for these kinds of trades.40  Specialists are no longer 
compensated through commissions for the trades that they broker; 
rather, they are compensated through a profit-sharing system, 
whereby the NYSE will pay them directly.41  What one must keep in 
mind is that at the time of specialist prosecutions, specialists were 
 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), under Section 11(b) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78K-1(b) (2012).  The SEC produced Rule 11b-1, 
which forced exchanges to make their own rules regarding specialists. 17 C.F.R. § 
240.11b-1 (2012); see also Colesanti, supra note 23, at 13. 
 37. See, e.g., Fleet Specialist, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-49499, 82 SEC 
Docket 1895, at *3 (Mar. 30, 2004) (discussing what a specialist should do when there 
are two matchable orders with different prices). 
 38. 5 HAZEN, supra note 29, at 342 (explaining that when “[t]he specialist acts 
solely as subagent, [she] receiv[es] a portion of the ‘book’ customer’s commission to 
his broker”).  At the time of Finnerty’s actions, 1999–2003, see Finnerty II, 474 F. 
Supp. 2d at 532, the NYSE specialists received a commission, see Member-Firm Fee 
Cap and Specialist Commissions on NYSE-Listed Equity Trading to Be Eliminated, 
NYSE EURONEXT (Dec. 2006), http://www.nyse.com/about/publication/ 
1165230695660.html (stating that in and before December 2006, specialists were 
compensated by commission). 
 39. Compare 5 HAZEN, supra note 29, at 342 (discussing how specialists receive a 
part of the public customer’s broker’s fee), and Colesanti, supra note 23, at 3 (noting 
that specialists “shar[e] in the commission”), with Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 544 
n.10 (citing United States v. Hunt, No. 05 CR. 395(DAB), 2006 WL 2613754, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006)) (agreeing that specialists are not compensated by their 
public customers). 
 40. See, e.g., Indictment ¶ 4, United States v. Hunt, No. 05 CR. 395(DAB) 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006), 2005 WL 5973581.  The confusion may stem from the fact 
that individuals may not be compensated by brokerage commissions, but by a salary 
and bonus, see Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 535 (discussing Finnerty’s 
compensation), while the firms themselves are compensated with commissions, see 
supra note 38. 
 41. Notice of Proposed Rule Change to Institute a Revised System of Payments 
to Specialist Firms, 72 Fed. Reg. 51,287 (Sep. 6, 2007) (effecting new plan for 
specialist compensation by profit sharing with the NYSE); Notice of Proposed Rule 
Change to Prohibit Specialists from Charging Transaction Fees in their Specialists 
Securities, 71 Fed. Reg. 71,217 (Dec. 8, 2006); NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE RULE 
104B (2008), available at http://nyserules.nyse.com/NYSETools/Platform 
Viewer.asp?searched=1&selectednode=chp_1_3_7_12&CiRestriction=104B&manual
=%2Fnyse%2Frules%2Fnyse-rules%2F; NYSE EURONEXT, supra note 38.  The 
NYSE changed this payment procedure in order to create a better incentivize 
specialists to create liquidity in their respective markets for shares. See Notice of 
Proposed Rule Change to Institute a Revised System of Payments to Specialist Firms, 
72 Fed. Reg. at 51,287–88. 
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compensated for the orders that they brokered between their public 
customers.42 
B. Interpositioning 
Interpositioning is occasioned by a pair of matchable limit orders 
for some security, say a bid limit order at $100 and an offer limit 
order at $99.90.43  The specialist “interposes” when she buys the 
security from the offeror, at $100, and then sells to the bidder at 
$99.90, pocketing ten cents on the trade.44  In this way, specialists can 
take advantage of their function of receiving limit orders45 and their 
ability to buy and sell on their own accounts46 by interposing 
themselves between a lower offer price and higher bid offer and 
trading on their own accounts, to buy from the offeror and then resell 
to the bidder.47  These trades added up to a rather large amount: $158 
million of lost client money, with one firm taking $38 million.48 
Thus, in 2005, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York indicted fifteen individuals working for specialist firms for fraud 
under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193449 and 
Rule 10b-550 for interpositioning.51  These indictments followed on the 
 
 42. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 43. By definition, any order where the bid is higher than the offer is matchable 
because whenever a buyer is willing to pay more than the seller wants, some bargain 
is possible between the two parties. See also supra notes 25–26 and accompanying 
text (explaining how specialists are made aware of bids and offers when they act as 
brokers for brokers).  On the other hand, if the bid is for a lower price than the offer, 
there cannot be a trade. See 5 HAZEN, supra note 29, at 342–43 (showing how a bid 
that is lower than the offer leads to inaction in the market, and may cause volatility 
without the intervention of specialists).  Orders that specify a price limit (bid or offer) 
are limit orders. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
 44. Emil J. Bove III, Institutional Factors Bearing on Criminal Charging 
Decisions in Complex Regulatory Environments, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1347, 1361 
(2008) (giving an analogous example). 
 45. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. 
 46. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
 47. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 48. See, e.g., Fleet Specialist, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-49499, 82 SEC 
Docket 1895, at *1 (Mar. 30, 2004) (noting that one specialist firm made $38 million 
through interpositioning between 1999 and 2003); Aaron Lucchetti & Kara Scannel, 
Fifteen Indicted in NYSE Case—Elite Specialists Are Charged; Exchange Also 
Settles Civil Charge and Will Videotape Its Traders, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2005, at C1 
(specialists cost their clients $158 million). 
 49. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 50. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).  Rule 10b-5 specifies the conduct that violates 
Section 10(b). Id.  An intentional violation of Section 10(b), along with violations of 
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heels of a settlement between the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the specialist firms, as well as another 
settlement with the NYSE.52 
The courts generally found that interpositioning did not violate 
Rule 10b-5 because the government could not prove deception53 or 
any untrue or misleading statements54—or statements made 
misleading by an omission.55  The Second Circuit, reviewing the 
District Court’s decision in Finnerty II, which set aside a guilty verdict 
by the jury, stated that although specialists’ interpositioning may have 
been conversion, it could not rise to the level of fraud, unless there 
were an accompanying breach of fiduciary duty.56  The courts 
generally found no fiduciary duty on the parts of the specialists.57  
There were two explanations.  First, the courts concluded that the 
specialists were not paid by their customers, and therefore specialists 
could not be the agents of their customers.58  Second, if specialists 
were to be the agents of their customers, specialists would then have 
two fiduciary relationships to two adversely positioned parties: a 
buyer and a seller.59 
 
most other section of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, carries with it criminal 
sanctions, under Section 32(a) of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2006). 
 51. See United States v. Finnerty (Finnerty I), Nos. 05 Cr. 393 DC, 05Cr. 391 DC, 
2006 WL 2802042, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2006); United States v. Hunt, No. 05 CR. 
395(DAB), 2006 WL 2613754, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006); United States v. 
Bongiorno, No. 05 CR. 390(HHS), 2006 WL 1140864, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2006); 
Lucchetti & Scannell, supra note 48, at C1. 
 52. Lucchetti & Scannell, supra note 48, at C1. 
 53. See, e.g., Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d 530, 539–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 533 
F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing how violations of Subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 
10b-5 need a showing of customer expectations).  The court was initially open to the 
possibility that the government could show that specialists deceived investors. See, 
e.g., Finnerty I, 2006 WL 2802042, at *4–5.  The court eventually decided that this 
required a showing of specific representations by the defendant or some showing of 
general customer expectations, which the government failed to produce. Finnerty II, 
474 F. Supp. 2d at 539–40. 
 54. See, e.g., Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at *4. 
 55. See, e.g., Bongiorno, 2006 WL 1140864, at *7. 
 56. See Finnerty III, 533 F.3d 143, 148–49 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing In re Refco 
Capital Mkts., Ltd., Brokerage Customer Sec. Litig., No. 06 Civ. 643(GEL), 2007 WL 
2694469, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2007)). 
 57. See, e.g., Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at *6. 
 58. See, e.g., Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 544 n.10 (citing Hunt, 2006 WL 
2613754, at *6).  For a discussion of the veracity of this claim see supra notes 39–40 
and accompanying text. 
 59. See, e.g., Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 544 (citing Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at 
*6).  The specifics of the courts’ decisions will be discussed infra Part II.A. 
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Yet, before the interpositioning cases went to trial, the SEC found 
interpositioning to be a violation of Rule 10b-5.60  Moreover, it settled 
with all the specialist firms that it accused of interpositioning.61  The 
SEC also settled with the NYSE for the interpositioning claims62 
because interpositioning is a violation of NYSE Rules63 and the 
NYSE failed to monitor its specialists and prevent their 
 
 60. See, e.g., Fleet Specialist, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-49499, 82 SEC 
Docket 1895, at *6 (Mar. 30, 2004).  One might ask why it is that if the SEC found 
deception in the actions of the specialists, it was not accorded Chevron deference in 
interpreting its organizational statute, see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–45 (1984), which is the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 for the SEC, see Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) 
(2006).  But, administrative agencies, such as the SEC, do not get Chevron deference 
for interpretations of statutes that courts do not consider ambiguous. Nat’l Credit 
Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 500 (1988).  Thus, the 
Supreme Court has always started its analysis of Rule 10b-5 deception and fraud by 
referring to the text of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
interpreting the term ‘deception’ on its own. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 
430 U.S. 462, 472–73 (1977) (“The rulemaking power granted to an administrative 
agency charged with the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make 
law.  Rather, it is ‘the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of 
Congress as expressed by the statute.’ . . . [The scope of the Rule] cannot exceed the 
power granted the Commission by Congress under s 10(b).” (alteration and omission 
in original) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213–14 (1976)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 
679 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that no 
Chevron deference was given to the SEC’s interpretation of Section 10(b) or Rule 
10b-5).  The SEC’s power extends only towards filling in “gaps” in its statutes, see 
Roth ex rel. Beacon Power Corp. v. Perseus, L.L.C., 522 F.3d 242, 248–49 (2d Cir. 
2008), but there are no gaps in the term ‘deceptive device’ in Section 10(b) or any 
delegation for the SEC to define that or any other term in Section 10(b), see 15 
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).  Similarly, the SEC would be hard-pressed to argue that it had 
Auer deference, given to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations in any 
way not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with regulation,” Auer v. Robbins, 519 
U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Robertson v. Methow 
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)), because Auer deference is only 
applicable when the underlying regulation is well within the limits of Chevron 
deference, cf. id. at 456 (“The [statute] grants the Secretary broad authority to 
‘defin[e] and delimi[t]’ the scope of the exemption for executive, administrative, and 
professional employees.” (alterations in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) 
(2006))).  Thus, courts interpreting Rule 10b-5 are free to ignore the SEC’s own 
views as to what constitutes deception and simply interpret ‘deception’ in Section 
10(b). Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 472 (citing Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197).  For the 
SEC’s view on interpositioning as fraud, see infra notes 222–225 and accompanying 
text. 
 61. Lucchetti & Scannell, supra note 48, at C1. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Bear Wagner, Inc., New York Stock Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 
04-51, ¶¶ 29–30 (Mar. 29, 2004), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/04-051.pdf 
(ruling that interpositioning is a violation of NYSE Rule 104). 
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interpositioning.64  The NYSE itself also penalized specialist firms for 
interpositioning.65 
Finally, in a decision certifying a class action against the NYSE 
specialists, In re NYSE Specialists Securities Litigation, the court 
appears to have been open to the idea that the class would be able to 
prove some manner of deception.66  If the class were able to prove 
that it was deceived by the specialists, it would be able to make out a 
case of fraud without proving fiduciary duty because, in short, 
fiduciary duty is merely one route to showing fraud: if one has garden 
variety deception, one need not show fiduciary duty.67 
C. Rule 10b-5 and Fraud 
Rule 10b-5, which specifies the acts that make up a violation of 
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,68 makes it 
illegal to use the national stock exchanges for any of the following 
three purposes, “in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security”: (a) commit fraud, (b) make untrue statements or omit to 
make statements that would make other statements, already made, 
misleading, or (c) engage in an “act, practice, or course of business 
which operates as a fraud.”69  Fraud, itself, is misrepresentation or 
deception; its elements are material misrepresentation, scienter, 
 
 64. Lucchetti & Scannell, supra note 48, at C1. 
 65. See Bear Wagner, New York Stock Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 04-51, 
¶¶ 29–30. 
 66. 260 F.R.D. 55, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that the class may be able to prove 
that specialist firms engaged in deceptive practices, within the context of showing 
predominance, pursuant to a class action).  This action has been settled with respect 
to the NYSE, a party to the litigation. Stipulation of Partial Settlement at 1, In re 
NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., No. 1:03-cv-08624-RWS (Apr. 4, 2010), available at 
http://securities.stanford.edu/1029/NYSE03-01/2010414_r01s_03CV08264.pdf.  
However, the class action against the specialist firms is still ongoing; as of March 28, 
2011 the settlement agreement had not been finalized. See Memorandum from David 
Rosenfeld on NYSE Specialists Distribution Funds (Mar. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/311445/311445-18.pdf. 
 67. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977) (explaining that 
fraud under Rule 10b-5 is only relevant as a showing of deception under Section 
10(b)).  For a discussion of fraud, see infra Part I.C.  For a discussion of fiduciary 
duty, see infra Part I.E.  For the courts’ discussions of whether specialists might owe a 
fiduciary duty, see infra Part II.A, and for my view of the matter see infra Parts III.B, 
III.C, and III.D. 
 68. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 69. 17 C.F.R. § 210.10b-5 (2012). 
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reliance, and causation.70  A fraud is when one party intentionally 
deceives (scienter and material misrepresentation) another party into 
making some action (reliance) that is damaging to the deceived party 
(causation).71  Thus, a violation of Rule 10b-5 and Section 10(b) 
requires the following elements: scienter, misrepresentation of a 
material fact, reliance causation, and the purchase of a security,72 
which are the requirements of fraud, along with the requirement that 
there be a purchase or sale of a security.73 
Breaching a fiduciary duty can but does not always lead to a 
finding of fraud.74  It is important to understand that not all breaches 
of fiduciary duty are fraud.75  Some fiduciary duties are based on the 
duty of care; the breach of such duty is regrettable but not necessarily 
deceptive.76  But a breach of the fiduciary duty to disclose information 
can be deceptive and thereby fraud.77  This is because when there is 
an affirmative duty to disclose information, a lack of disclosure 
suggests that there is no information to disclose.  Thus, when 
something happens that a fiduciary was under duty to disclose, the 
absence of disclosure is akin to stating that nothing has happened: this 
is deception; and so it is also fraud.78  Statements are not necessary for 
fraud: “conduct itself can be deceptive.”79 
 
 70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525–26, 529 (1977).  Scienter is 
knowledge that what one is representing as true is false, or uncertainty that what one 
is representing as true is true. See id. § 526. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See Burke v. Jacoby, 981 F.2d 1372, 1378 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 73. The elements of fraud are coextensive with those of a Rule 10b-5 violation but 
for the latter’s requirement that the misrepresentation be with regard to the sale or 
purchase of a security. Compare id., with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525–
26, 529 (1977) (stating and explaining the elements of fraud). 
 74. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74 (1977). 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. at 470, 474 (rejecting the lower court’s determination that an action 
that was made without a justifiable business purpose could be fraud even though 
there was no deception or manipulation). 
 77. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (“[S]ilence in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as a fraud actionable 
under § 10(b) . . . .  [But such liability is premised upon] a duty to disclose arising 
from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction.”). 
 78. See id.; United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Fraud in the 
common law sense of deceit is committed by deliberately misleading another by 
words, by acts, or, in some instances—notably where there is a fiduciary relationship, 
which creates a duty to disclose all material facts—by silence.” (citing W. PAGE 
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 105–06 (5th ed. 
1984))).  One of the reasons that it seems hard to find a simple expression of the way 
that fiduciary duty may lead to fraud is because, originally, fraud was an action in 
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D. Some Possible Analogies to Interpositioning 
Before moving on to when fiduciary duties are created80 and what 
fiduciary duties entail,81 it is useful to set the stage by considering two 
practices similar to interpositioning that are outlawed: trading ahead82 
and insider trading.83 
1. Trading Ahead 
Interpositioning appears to be very similar to a prohibited practice 
called trading ahead.  Trading ahead occurs when a broker buys a 
security, while knowing that one of her customers will buy that 
security later.84  Brokers are well positioned to do this because 
brokers receive orders from their customers and thus know what their 
customers will buy.85  In United States v. Dial, the Seventh Circuit 
ruled that trading ahead is a fraud under the mail and wire fraud 
statutes86 because it is a failure “to ‘level’ with one to whom one owes 
fiduciary duties.”87  In that case, broker Donald Dial, the defendant, 
solicited a large order for silver futures from his customers, but before 
he put that order on the market he put in an order for himself (and 
his brokerage house).88  Once Dial decided that the price was too 
high, he sold his (and his brokerage house’s) silver future positions 
first, before selling those of his customers, whom he had solicited to 
sell the futures, as well.89  Thus, he first denied his customers a lower 
 
law, see, e.g., Moseley v. All Things Possible, Inc., 694 S.E.2d 43, 45 (S.C. Ct. App. 
2010), while breach of fiduciary duty was an action in equity, see, e.g., In re 
Evangelist, 760 F.2d 27, 29 (1st Cir. 1985). 
 79. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158 
(2008); see also Dial, 757 F.2d at 168 (“But if someone asks you to break a $10 bill, 
and you give him two $1 bills instead of two $5’s because you know he cannot read 
and won’t know the difference, that is fraud.”). 
 80. That is, when a fiduciary relationship is created. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).  This issue is discussed infra Part I.E.1. 
 81. The nature of fiduciary duties and the difference between the duty of ordinary 
care and the duty of disclosure are discussed infra Part I.E.2. 
 82. Trading ahead is illegal under Dial, 757 F.3d, and it is discussed in the 
following Section: I.D.1. 
 83. Insider trading has been illegal ever since SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 
F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).  Insider trading is discussed infra Part I.D.2. 
 84. See Dial, 757 F.2d at 165–66. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006); Dial, 757 F.2d at 168–69. 
 87. See Dial, 757 F.2d at 168. 
 88. See id. at 166–67. 
 89. See id. 
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buying price and then a higher selling price, taking both for himself.90  
The Seventh Circuit, in a lucid opinion by Judge Richard Posner, 
explained that brokers owe a fiduciary duty to their customers to get 
them the best possible price.91 
Dial misled his customers when he solicited their orders but did not 
get them the best possible price.92  He traded ahead of his customers, 
putting his large personal order ahead of their orders.93  His large 
order pushed up the price of silver for the customers, whose orders 
were filled at the increased market price.94  The corollary of this was 
that Dial’s earlier order benefitted from the price increase that was 
brought about by the subsequent large customer order.95  Similarly, 
when it was time to sell, Dial sold off his large order first, at a higher 
price, and then executed his customer’s sell orders afterwards, at a 
price that was deflated by Dial’s own large sell order.96  In this way, 
Dial was able to buy at a relatively lower price and sell at a relatively 
higher price, to his benefit and to his customers’ detriment.97  He thus 
made a profit by misleading his customers, which was fraud.98 
Although trading ahead has been likened to interpositioning,99 Dial 
differs from the interpositioning prosecutions in that Dial solicited 
orders,100 while interpositioning does not require any solicitation, 
since limit orders come to specialists as a matter of course.101  
Moreover, the Dial court found that brokers are fiduciaries of their 
clients,102 while the interpositioning cases did not find that specialists 
 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. at 168 (citing Marchese v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 734 F.2d 414, 
418 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id. (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 183, 
194–95 (1963)). 
 99. See, e.g., Fleet Specialist, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-49499, 82 SEC 
Docket 1895, at *4 (Mar. 30, 2004) (explaining that trading ahead is like 
interpositioning, except that there is not necessarily a second trade); Colesanti, supra 
note 23, at 22 (noting that interpositioning is related to trading ahead). 
 100. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 101. Specialists receive customer orders passively. See supra notes 25–28 and 
accompanying text. 
 102. See Dial, 757 F.2d at 168. 
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are fiduciaries of their customers,103 nor did those courts even agree 
that brokers are fiduciaries of their customers.104 
2. Insider Trading 
Another analogy to interpositioning is insider trading.  Trading 
ahead, somewhat similar to interpositioning,105 has been equated to 
insider trading.106  Insider trading is trading on material non-public 
information in breach of a fiduciary duty.107  The “classical theory” of 
insider trading—so termed in United States v. O’Hagan108—was 
premised on the fiduciary duty of loyalty that an employee of a 
corporation owed to the shareholders of a corporation not to buy 
stocks from those shareholders using information that the employee 
should have disclosed to the shareholders.109 
Another theory is the misappropriation theory, coined by the 
government, in O’Hagan.110  Insider trading can also be fraud when it 
breaches a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the source of information.111  In 
O’Hagan, the source of information was a company, Grand 
Metropolitan PLC (Grand Met) that intended to buy another firm, 
Pillsbury Co.112  Grand Met had hired defendant James O’Hagan’s 
law firm in connection with the purchase.113  O’Hagan then went on to 
buy shares of Pillsbury, the acquisition target, and resold them when 
they rose as a result of the public takeover announcement.114  In other 
 
 103. See, e.g., Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d 530, 544 & n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 
533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008).  For a discussion of specialist fiduciary duty, see infra 
Parts I.E, III.B, III.C, and III.D. 
 104. See, e.g., United States v. Hunt, No. 05 CR. 395(DAB), 2006 WL 2613754, at 
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006) (citing De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 
1293, 1308–09 (2d Cir. 2002); Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d 
Cir. 1999); Bissel v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 937 F. Supp. 237, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). 
 105. See supra note 99. 
 106. See Dial, 757 F.2d at 167–68 (equating trading ahead to insider trading). 
 107. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997) (citations 
omitted) (discussing the “classical” and “misappropriation” theories of insider 
trading). 
 108. See id. at 651. 
 109. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227–29 (1980); Cady, Roberts & 
Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-6668, 40 S.E.C. 907, at *3 (Nov. 8, 1961) (stating 
that an insider of a corporation must either disclose her information to the 
shareholders or forego trading on the security). 
 110. See 521 U.S. at 652. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. at 647. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See id. at 648. 
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words, the holding of O’Hagan was that a fiduciary of a buyer 
corporation115 owed a duty, to the buyer, not to buy the shares of a 
company whose shares the principal (the buyer) wanted to buy.  
O’Hagan had “misappropriated” information: the knowledge of the 
buyer’s intention to buy shares of a company, before that intention 
was made public.116  At this point, it is useful to note the similarity of 
the misappropriation theory of insider trading to trading ahead: in 
both scenarios, a fiduciary knows that a principal will be making a 
purchase and then buys ahead of the principal, knowing that the value 
of the thing purchased shall increase as a result of the principal’s 
purchase.117  In both situations the principal is robbed of the ability to 
make use of its information for its sole benefit.118 
E. The Fiduciary Duties of Specialists 
There are two components to understanding the fiduciary duties of 
specialists.  First, when does fiduciary duty attach to the actions of 
specialists?119  And second, if some fiduciary duty does exist, what are 
the contours of that fiduciary duty?120 
1. Establishing Fiduciary Duty 
One commentator, in arguing that specialists stood to gain from 
old-fashioned insider trading, said, without explaining, that specialists 
owed a fiduciary duty to their customers when trading on their 
behalf.121  And, early courts were quite ready to identify specialists as 
 
 115. Lawyers are fiduciaries of companies during buy-out deals. Dirks v. SEC, 463 
U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983). 
 116. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53. 
 117. Compare United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 165–68 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(describing the practice of trading ahead), with O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647–48 
(describing the acts of O’Hagan in purchasing the stock of his principal’s acquisition 
target before the acquisition did and making a tidy profit when the target was finally 
bought). 
 118. Compare Dial, 757 F.2d at 165–66, 168 (describing the damage to the 
customers of a broker when the broker traded ahead), with O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654 
(citing Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25–27 (1987)) (describing the damage 
to a principal when a fiduciary misappropriates the principal’s information). 
 119. A discussion of whether and when fiduciary duties attach to the actions of 
specialists follows infra Part I.E.1. 
 120. For a discussion of the kinds of fiduciary duties there are between agents and 
principles, see infra Part I.E.2. 
 121. See Note, The Downstairs Insider: The Specialist and Rule 10b-5, 42 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 695, 697 (1967) (“As broker, the specialist holds and executes orders for the 
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fiduciaries of their customers.122  At the very least, early courts held 
that the specialist was a subagent of the customer’s broker, who was, 
in turn, an agent of the public customer.123  Subagency is sufficient to 
establish fiduciary duty between the principal and subagent.124  
Although this duty can indeed be modified by contract,125 specialists 
do not have contracts with their public customers that relieve them of 
any fiduciary duties.126 
Prior to the specialist prosecutions, there was the 1993 case of 
Market Street Limited Partners v. Englander Capital Corp. that held 
specialists to have the same fiduciary obligations as brokers.127  The 
duties of brokers are of best execution, which means getting their 
customers the best available price.128  From there, the law gets rather 
 
public on a commission basis.  When he does so he is an agent and has a fiduciary 
obligation to his principal, the purchaser or seller of stock.”). 
 122. See Helfhat v. Whitehouse, 179 N.E. 493, 495–96 (N.Y. 1932) (noting that a 
“contract between a broker and his customer is primarily one of agency,” and that 
“[w]here a broker executes an order through a subagent called a floor broker or 
specialist, the subagent is ordinarily under the same restrictions as the original 
broker” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see also Hall v. Paine, 112 N.E. 153, 
158 (Mass. 1916) (“A broker’s obligation to his principal [seller] requires him to 
secure the highest price obtainable . . . .”). 
 123. See Helfhat, 179 N.E. at 495–96.  As noted above, the Dial court ruled that 
brokers were fiduciaries of their customers. Dial, 757 F.2d at 168 (citing Marchese v. 
Shearson Hayden Stores, Inc., 734 F.2d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
 124. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.15(1) (2006); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 428(1)–(2) (1958); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 428 
(1933). 
 125. See Helfhat, 179 N.E. at 496 (discussing customs of exchanges that might 
modify fiduciary duty). 
 126. Indeed, specialists at the NYSE are bound to put the interests of their 
customers first, before trading for their own benefit. See supra note 36 and 
accompanying text.  Thus, it would be quite hard to conclude that specialists are 
relieved by contract of fiduciary duties to their public customers, if one were inclined 
to make such an argument.  Compare this to the duties of market makers in “dealer 
markets” such as the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations (NASDAQ), where market makers actually publish the prices at which 
they will agree to buy and sell the securities in which they specialize, putting their 
customers on notice that the market maker will be between (i.e., interposed 
themselves between) the buyer and the seller of a security, and capture the difference 
in prices. See Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 
268 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 127. Mkt. St. Ltd. Partners v. Englander Capital Corp., No. 92 CIV. 7434 (LMM), 
1993 WL 212817, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1993) (citing Helfnat, 179 N.E. at 496; 
Note, supra note 121, at 697). 
 128. Newton, 135 F.3d at 270; United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 
1985) (citing Marchese v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 734 F.2d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 
1984)); Mkt. St., 1993 WL 212817, at *9 (citing Fustok v. Conticommodity Servs. Inc., 
618 F. Supp. 1082, 1088 (S.D.N.Y.1985)). 
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muddled.  The Second Circuit, in De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & 
Co., stated that a broker has no general fiduciary duty to advise 
clients about developments in stock prices unless the broker has been 
given discretion to control a customer’s account by the customer.129  
There appears to be some confusion over whether brokers are 
fiduciaries under New York law,130 but the confusion is one between 
kinds of fiduciary duties.131  It is the difference between the duty to 
carry out a requested transaction, which is a fiduciary duty, and the 
duty to report the underlying business-information for that 
transaction, which is not a fiduciary duty that brokers owe to their 
customers.132  Therefore, though a broker does not owe a fiduciary 
duty of updating the customer about business developments, a broker 
does owe a fiduciary duty of best execution.133  While on the topic of 
establishing agency, it is worthwhile to note that compensation is not 
a necessary requirement for the creation of agency.134  Rather, agency 
is created when a principal consents for an agent to act on her behalf, 
the agent also consents to this, and the principal retains control over 
the agent.135 
2. Fiduciary Duties 
Agents have two kinds of fiduciary duties: loyalty and care.136  The 
duty of loyalty, inter alia, includes three particular duties.  First, an 
agent cannot “acquire a material benefit from a third party in 
connection with transactions conducted . . . on behalf of the 
principal.”137  This includes the “secret profits” doctrine that an agent 
cannot profit from her interaction with a third party through the use 
of the agent’s position of agency.138  This also includes the doctrine of 
 
 129. 306 F.3d 1293, 1302 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 130. See Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 131. See id. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. 
 134. There is no requirement that an agent be paid.  There need only be agreement 
between an agent and principal that the agent shall act on behalf of the principal. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. §§ 8.01, 8.08 (noting duties “to act loyally” and “to act with [] care,” 
“[s]ubject to any agreement with the principal”). 
 137. Id. § 8.02. 
 138. See Reading v. The King, (1948) 2 K.B. 268, 275 (U.K.) (“[If] the position 
which [the agent] occupies [is] the real cause of his obtaining the money, as distinct 
from being a mere opportunity of getting it . . . then he is accountable for it to the 
[principal]. . . .  It is a case where the servant has unjustly enriched himself by virtue 
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“corporate opportunity,” that an agent who receives a business 
opportunity that both she and her principal might take should not 
take it upon herself to decide whether the employer should take the 
opportunity.139  Second, there is the duty “not to use . . . confidential 
information of the principal for the agent’s own purposes.”140  This is a 
restatement of the holding of O’Hagan.141  Third, there is a duty on 
the part of an agent not to serve more than one principal in the same 
transaction, without those principals’ consent.142  Similarly, the correct 
course of action for an agent faced with either secret profits or an 
opportunity that rightfully belongs to the principal is to disclose to the 
principal the nature of the situation and let the principal make the 
final decision.143 
One interesting point in conjunction with specialists and brokers is 
the problem of a fiduciary having two conflicting principals.  The 
Restatement (Third) of Agency allows this configuration to exist, but 
only when both principals know that their agent is working for them 
both at the same time.144  The agent is to communicate all relevant 
information to her principals145 and must resign her position as agent 
 
of his service without his master’s sanction.” (emphasis added)); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 cmt. b (2006); cf. Jerlyn Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Wayne R. 
Roman Yacht Brokerage, 950 F.2d 60, 63–64, 67 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting that a 
broker’s non-disclosure of a rebate, who was seller, was a “secret profit”). 
 139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 cmt. d (2006); cf. Gen. Auto. Mfg. 
Co. v. Singer, 120 N.W.2d 659, 663 (Wis. 1963) (discussing the corporate opportunity 
doctrine in relation to an agent’s duty to not take opportunities that are sent to the 
principal). 
 140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05(2) (2006). 
 141. See id. § 8.05 reporter’s note c (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 
(1997)); supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06(2)(b) (2006). 
 143. An act that would otherwise violate the duties of loyalty is allowable if the 
principal consents, which requires the agent to disclose all material facts. Id. § 
8.06(1)(a)(ii) (an agent must “disclose[] all material facts that the agent knows, has 
reason to know, or should know would reasonably affect the principal’s judgment 
unless the principal has manifested that such facts are already known by the principal 
or that the principal does not wish to know them,” in order to obtain the principal’s 
consent for an action that would otherwise be a violation of the duty of loyalty); see 
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (noting “undisclosed, self-serving 
use of principal’s information”); Gen. Auto. Mfg. Co. v. Singer, 120 N.W.2d 659, 663 
(Wis. 1963) (“Rather than to resolve the conflict of interest between his side line 
business and [the principal’s] business in favor of serving and advancing his own 
personal interests, [the agent] had the duty to exercise good faith by disclosing to [the 
principal] all the facts regarding this matter.”). 
 144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06(2)(b)(i) (2006); accord 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 392 (1958). 
 145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06(2)(b)(ii) (2006). 
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if her duties to one principal prevent her from revealing information 
to another principal that the latter would reasonably want to know in 
a given transaction.146  Yet, an agent is not expected to reveal the 
reservation prices147 of one principal to another, because that 
information is confidential.148 
But, while reservation prices may be confidential, bid and offer 
prices are not (even if they are still non-public): an agent is expected 
to reveal the bid and offer prices of two adverse parties to each 
other.149  In Jerlyn Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Wayne R. Roman Yacht 
Brokerage, the First Circuit, applying Massachusetts law, held that 
where an agent first failed to tell the buyer that his seller would 
indeed accept a bid for $800,000, and then, when the buyer raised the 
bid to $850,000, the agent failed to tell the seller of the raised bid and 
captured the difference for himself, there was a potential breach of 
fiduciary duty.150  The fiduciary duty was owed to both the seller and 
the buyer.151  The corollary is that the agent had a duty to disclose to 
his two principals, the buyer and the seller, their respective bid and 
offer prices.152 
F. Economic Terminology and a Dose of Legal Realism: 
 
 146. See id. §§ 8.03 cmt. b, 8.06 cmt. d(2). 
 147. The reservation price is the highest price that a buyer is willing to pay, or the 
lowest price that a seller is willing to collect. Reservation Price, NEGOTIATION 
EXPERTS, http://www.negotiations.com/definition/reservation-price/ (last visited Feb. 
15, 2013); cf. THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 374 (David W. Pearce 
ed., The Macmillan Press 4th ed. 1992) (1981) (defining a reservation wage as the 
lowest wage that an employee might take). 
 148. Hirsch v. Schwartz, 209 A.2d 635, 639 (N.J. 1965) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 392 cmt. b (1958)). 
 149. Jerlyn Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Wayne R. Roman Yacht Brokerage, 950 F.2d 60, 
67–68 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 150. Id.  The procedural posture of the case was an appeal over a jury instruction.  
The court did not consider whether there was a breach of fiduciary duty because the 
jury had to decide whether the $50,000 price difference was a material fact that the 
seller or buyer might have cared about. See id. at 68–69.  The plaintiffs were the 
buyer and the seller, while the defendant was the broker. Id. at 61–62. 
 151. See id. at 68 (“Plainly it was an open question whether [the agent] did not 
violate this principle [the duty to abstain from secret profits] here when (a) he may 
have concealed from [the buyer] information that [the seller] had accepted the 
former’s $800,000 offer, and (b) he faxed the $800,000 agreement to [the seller] for 
signature without advising [the seller] that [the buyer] had, in fact, raised his offer to 
$850,000.”). 
 152. See id. (noting that the broker could have carried out his duty if he had 
disclosed to the parties either their actual bid and offer or his intent to take a higher 
commission than initially agreed upon); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 
8.06(2)(b)(ii) (2006). 
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Arbitrage and Rent 
Finally, it is worthwhile to consider specialist interpositioning as it 
affects the wider economy.  The late Professor Lon Fuller argued that 
laws exist to solve problems: there is a nexus between formal 
doctrines and the social problems that they address.153  All legal rules, 
therefore, can be defined through their associated problems.154  This 
was so, argued Professor Fuller, because though legislators could not 
foresee every possible outcome or problem, they could think about 
concepts, which could take different shapes with a constant, common 
element.155  Hence, to fully evaluate the practice of interpositioning 
from Professor Fuller’s partially Legal Realist perspective,156 one 
ought to have some idea of the economic nature of the activities that 
are prohibited by the anti-fraud provisions of Rule 10b-5, compared 
with other similar but beneficent economic activities. 
Interpositioning has been called a form of arbitrage.157  Arbitrage is 
[a]n operation involving simultaneous purchase and sale of an asset, 
e.g. a commodity or currency, in two or more markets between 
which there are price difference or discrepancies.  The arbitrageur 
aims to profit from the price difference; the effect of his action is to 
lessen or eliminate the price difference.158 
It is often argued that arbitrage is socially beneficial because it 
leads the price of a good or asset to be the same in two different 
markets, avoiding the inefficiency of a good being over- or under-
valued anywhere.159   
 
 153. For example, Professor Fuller argued that were society to erase the doctrine 
of consideration from the law, society’s solution to the problems that the doctrine 
addressed would probably take a similar form to that doctrine. See Lon L. Fuller, 
Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 824 (1941). 
 154. See id. 
 155. Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 446–47 (1934). 
 156. Professor Fuller did not consider himself a proper Legal Realist because of his 
view that legal concepts had value, compared with the view that he ascribed to Karl 
Llewellyn, that legal concepts had no value. See id. at 443–44. 
 157. Finnerty III, 533 F.3d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 158. THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS, supra note 147, at 17. 
 159. E. Glen Weyl, Is Arbitrage Socially Beneficial? (Oct. 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://home.uchicago.edu/weyl/Second_Draft_ 
Arbitrage.pdf.  Arbitrage is something that is impossible in a general equilibrium. See 
Leonidas C. Koutsougeras & Konstantinos G. Papadopoulos, Arbitrage and 
Equilibrium in Strategic Security Markets, 23 ECON. THEORY 553, 553–54 (2004) 
(explaining that arbitrage is only possible in markets where there is no equilibrium).  
A general equilibrium is when prices have set in and do not change because they are 
perfect for an economic system. THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS, 
supra note 147, at 169. 
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Another potentially useful economic term for this discussion is 
economic rent.  Economic rent is “[a] payment to a factor in excess of 
what is necessary to keep it to its present employment.”160  Rent is 
generally considered an undeserved income (the earner has done 
nothing to earn it), in that if the income were removed (or, rather, the 
portion of it that is economic rent) the earner would not stop her 
activity, if any.161  The nineteenth century economist David Ricardo 
explained that rent is essentially what is paid for that which would 
happen with or without that payment, using the example of timber 
that might grow in Norway.162  Ricardo distinguished the price paid 
for removing trees from Norway, the payment for the wages of the 
movers and also the rarity of the product, from payment for the 
ability to grow trees; for trees would always grow, regardless of 
whether anyone was paid.163  The corollary is that rent is essentially 
windfall income, such as when a landlord takes income for the fact 
that she owns a field on which trees grow, despite the fact that the 
trees would grow there with or without that landlord, or any 
landlord.164  In other words, rent is income associated with a legal 
position rather than income due to some form of production—it is a 
pure wealth transfer between the person owning the property and the 
person interested in making use of it, rather than payment for a good 
or service.165 
Where there is rent, there is another phenomenon called rent-
seeking, whereby individuals seek the windfall that is rent.166  The 
 
 160. THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS, supra note 147, at 121.  A 
definition better grounded in the origin of the term is the excess of what a factor 
receives not over what is necessary to keep it to its current employment but over any 
employment. See id.  For a general discussion of these two different conceptions of 
economic rent, see A. Ross Shepherd, Economic Rent and Industry Supply Curve, 37 
S. ECON. J. 209 (1970).  All references to ‘rent’ or ‘economic rent’ are 
interchangeable; this Note does not deal with the “rent” that landlords take from 
their tenants. 
 161. See MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS, supra note 147, at 121 
(implying that a laborer that receives a rent wage would remain employed even if it 
were taken away). 
 162. See DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
TAXATION 33–34 (J.M. Dent & Sons 1911) (1817). 
 163. See id. (distinguishing between the “liberty of removing and selling the 
timber” from “the liberty of growing it”). 
 164. Cf. id. 
 165. Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. 
ECON. J. 224, 229 (1967). 
 166. See Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society, 64 
AM. ECON. REV. 291, 302–03 (1974) (discussing rent in the form of import licenses). 
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existence of rent leads individuals to expend their economic resources 
to have the right to those rents (to that windfall income), rather than 
expand economic resources on producing wealth.167  A good example 
is given by Professor Gordon Tullock, who shows that in a pure 
transfer of wealth situation, individuals will spend resources on 
attempting to either prevent or bring about the wealth transfer.168  
Specifically, thievery is a wealth transfer.169  And, just as a thief will 
expend resources to get thieving equipment, so too will individuals 
pay for the police, courts, and locks to prevent the thief from 
“transferring” wealth away from them.170  The end cost is that instead 
of using its resources to produce something else, society winds up 
spending resources to prevent something from happening, while the 
thief, instead of producing something, spends resources to take 
something from someone else.171  Rent-seeking, where parties 
compete with each other to capture rent income, has essentially the 
same effect: rather than expanding resources to produce, people 
expend resources in order to compete with each other for rent 
income.172 
With this background it will be possible to appreciate the real 
economic nature of interpositioning.173 
II.  THE CONFLICT: THE COURTS’ AND THE GOVERNMENT’S 
ANALYSES OF INTERPOSITIONING AND FRAUD 
On the one side, the court decisions that culminated with Finnerty 
III174 ruled that specialists’ interpositioning was not a fraud in 
violation of Rule 10b-5.175  On the other, the government tried to 
make a case that specialists were agents of their customers, owed 
fiduciary duties to those customers, and by breaching those fiduciary 
 
 167. See James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and the 
Laws of Succession, 26 J. L. & ECON. 71, 83 (1983) ("By contrast, rent seeking is 
socially inefficient because the process in itself creates no value while utilizing scarce 
resources.”); Krueger, supra note 166, at 295 (explaining the difference between 
trade tariffs and import licenses from the perspective of rent-seeking). 
 168. Tullock, supra note 165, at 229–31. 
 169. See id. at 228. 
 170. See id. at 229–31. 
 171. See id. 
 172. Cf. Krueger, supra note 166, at 301–03. 
 173. For a discussion of whether and how interpositioning fits into these economic 
categories, see infra Part III.A. 
 174. 533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 175. Id. 
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duties had committed fraud.176  Before any of the prosecutions went 
to trial, the SEC and the NYSE decided that interpositioning was 
simply deceptive, and thereby fraud, without reaching the question of 
fiduciary duty.177 
A. The Logic of the Courts 
There are five reported court decisions that discuss the specialist 
prosecutions.  In the beginning, there were three similar motions to 
dismiss where the courts first looked at the sort of evidence that 
would be needed to make the government’s case: United States v. 
Bongiorno,178 United States v. Hunt,179 and Finnerty I.180  Then came 
Finnerty’s motion to set aside his guilty verdict, Finnerty II.181  Finally 
came the government’s appeal of the District Court’s decision to set 
aside Finnerty’s conviction, Finnerty III.182 
At the motion to dismiss stage, the Bongiorno, Hunt, and Finnerty 
I courts separated Rule 10b-5 into its three prongs and held that 
violations of prongs (a) and (c), prohibiting fraud, could be proved at 
trial by the government.183  At this point, the courts agreed that, in 
principle, interpositioning could be found to be a form of fraud 
because customers likely did not expect that their trades would not be 
getting the best price, when the rules of the exchanges spoke to the 
contrary.184 
But, the Bongiorno court ruled that even if specialists did owe a 
fiduciary duty of best execution to their customers, as do brokers, a 
 
 176. See, e.g., Government’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s 
Pretrial Motions at 13–16, United States v. Hunt, No. 05 CR. 395(DAB), 2006 WL 
2613754 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006), 2006 WL 5149675 [hereinafter Government 
Memorandum in Hunt]. 
 177. E.g., Fleet Specialist, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-49499, 82 SEC 
Docket 1895, at *2, 8 (Mar. 30, 2004); see Bear Wagner, Inc., New York Stock 
Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 04-51, ¶¶ 29–30 (Mar. 29, 2004). 
 178. No. 05 Cr. 390(SHS), 2006 WL 1140864 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2006). 
 179. No. 05 CR. 395(DAB), 2006 WL 2613754 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006). 
 180. Nos. 05 Cr. 393 DC, 05 Cr. 397 DC, 2006 WL 2802042 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2006). 
 181. Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 182. Finnerty III, 533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008).  As a result of this decision, two 
other specialist convictions were overturned, without any extra discussion of the 
merits of the case. See United States v. Hayward, 284 F. App’x 857 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 183. Finnerty I, 2006 WL 2802042, at *4–5; Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at *4; 
Bongiorno, 2006 WL 1140864, at *5–6. 
 184. Finnerty I, 2006 WL 2802042, at *5 (citing Bongiorno 2006 WL 1140864, at 
*6–7); Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at *4 (citing Bongiorno, 2006 WL 1140864, at *6–7); 
Bongiorno, 2006 WL 1140864, at *6–7. 
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violation of such a duty does not rise to a fraud, and therefore could 
not, in and of itself, constitute a deception.185  The court added that, 
without a statement that was itself made misleading or deceptive by 
an omission, an omission (a failure to do something) could not be the 
basis of fraud.186  The Finnerty I court adopted the reasoning of the 
Bongiorno court, agreeing that even if specialists did have a fiduciary 
duty to their customers, its violation, without a misstatement or a 
statement that was made deceptive by an omission, was not a Rule 
10b-5 violation.187  In other words, both courts ruled that the 
specialists’ failure to get the best price for their customers was not 
deceptive because they had never promised any such thing. 
The next case was Hunt, where the court agreed with the above188 
analysis in Bongiorno and Finnerty I,189 but went further by denying 
that specialists had any fiduciary duty at all.190  Specifically, the court 
construed New York law to state that brokers owed no fiduciary duty 
when they had no discretion over customers’ accounts and acted only 
to effect customers’ orders, citing De Kwiatkowski, among others.191  
Since brokers owed no fiduciary duty to their customers, neither did 
specialists.192  Thus, the court was able to follow the precedent of an 
earlier case, Market Street, without following its conclusion,193 
 
 185. Bongiorno, 2006 WL 1140864, at *7–8. 
 186. See id. at *8–9. 
 187. Finnerty I, 2006 WL 2802042, at *6–7 (citing Bongiorno, 2006 WL 1140864, at 
*8–9).  The Finnerty I court also rejected the argument that what Finnerty did was 
analogous to over-charging by brokers for securities, because unlike brokers, 
specialists do not solicit their customers. Id. at *6 (citing Grandon v. Merrill Lynch & 
Co., 147 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 188. See supra notes 185–87 and accompanying text. 
 189. See Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at *4. 
 190. See id. at *5–6. 
 191. See id. (citing De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1308–09 
(2d Cir. 2002); Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1999); 
Bissel v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 937 F. Supp. 237, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). 
 192. See id. (rejecting the argument that specialists owe a fiduciary duty to their 
customers). 
 193. Market Street stood for the proposition that specialists owe the same fiduciary 
duty to their customers that brokers owe to their customers. Mkt. St. Ltd. Partners v. 
Englander Capital Corp., No. 92 CIV. 7434 (LMM), 1993 WL 212817, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 14, 1993) (citing Helfhat v. Whitehouse, 179 N.E. 493, 496 (N.Y. 1932)); see also 
supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing Market Street).  And, the court 
also noted that brokers did have a fiduciary duty to their customers. Id. (citing Fustok 
v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1082, 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).  Thus, the 
court concluded that specialists had a limited fiduciary duty. See id.  The apparent 
conflict between Market Street on one side, and Hunt and De Kwiatkowski on the 
other, is discussed in Part III.B, infra. 
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resulting in the holding: even if specialists had the same fiduciary 
duties as brokers, neither had a fiduciary duty to their customers.194 
The court also noted that because specialists had to execute both 
buy and sell orders that met in the middle, at the specialists trading 
desk,195 if a specialist owed a fiduciary duty to anyone, she would owe 
it to both buyer and seller, implying that this was another reason that 
specialists could not be said to owe a fiduciary duty to their 
customers.196  The court then distinguished Market Street on the 
ground that specialists in the earlier case were paid, while, in Hunt, 
the government did not allege that specialists received compensation 
from their customers.197  Finally, the court noted that even if there 
were a breach, and if mere omissions could be fraud, the 
government’s case would be circular because the only omission that 
the government could pin on the defendants was that they omitted to 
state a breach of fiduciary duty.198  The court found the argument that 
a disclosure duty could be breached by failing to mention that one 
was breaching that disclosure duty to be circular.199 
After the Bongiorno, Hunt, and Finnerty I cases had their motions 
to dismiss denied,200 a jury convicted Finnerty of a violation of Rule 
10b-5, but the court set that verdict aside.201  The court explained that 
the defendant could not be convicted when the government had not 
proven a violation of any of the prongs of Rule 10b-5.202  Specifically, 
the court explained that although prongs (a) and (c) could have been 
proven by fraud, this required some proof of what customers had 
actually expected of the specialists, while the government had only 
furnished proof of what the defendant knew he had to do—there was 
 
 194. See Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at *5 (“‘[A] specialist has fiduciary obligations 
closely resembling, if not identical to, those of a broker.’ However, stockbrokers 
generally do not owe a fiduciary duty unless a customer has delegated discretionary 
trading authority to that broker.” (quoting Bongiorno, 2006 WL 1140864, at *7) 
(citing De Kwiatkowski, 306 F.3d at 1308–09)). 
 195. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 196. See Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at *6 (“[S]pecialists have no loyalty to buyers 
and sellers as they execute orders for both . . . .”). 
 197. See Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at *6. 
 198. Id. at *7. 
 199. See id.; cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06 (stating that an action 
that would have otherwise breached a duty, would not be a breach if the principal 
had been informed in advance and consented to the action). 
 200. See supra notes 178–180. 
 201. Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
 202. See id. at 539–40. 
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no proof that Finnerty’s customers knew that they were supposed to 
be getting the best price for their orders, in line with NYSE rules.203  
In its discussion of the utter lack of proof of customer expectations, 
the court appeared to be quite angry that it and the jurors felt left out 
of the loop: 
What, if any, understanding did customers have as to a specialist’s 
obligations?  What did customers expect when presenting an order 
to the specialist?  What did customers “trust” the specialists to do?  
Did customers even know that a specialist could trade for his 
proprietary account?  Did customers assume that the specialist was 
providing services without charge?  Or did customers know that the 
specialist was trading for his own account and making a profit?  Did 
customers believe that they would get the best possible price and, if 
so, what was the basis for that belief?  Would customers have 
thought they had been deceived upon learning that in some trades, 
where they bought or sold within their limits or at market price, the 
specialist made a profit of a few cents a share for the proprietary 
account? 
Some of the answers to these questions may be obvious to those 
with knowledge of the industry, but none of these questions were 
answered by the evidence presented at trial.204 
The court then went on to adopt two parts of the Hunt analysis of 
fiduciary duty, to put aside the theory that by taking money from his 
customers in violation of a fiduciary duty, Finnerty had committed 
fraud.205  In particular, the Finnerty II court picked up on the idea that 
a specialist would have two principals, if any, and concluded that 
specialists therefore could not have any principals.206  And, in a 
footnote, the court adopted the idea that since specialists were not 
paid—or that since the government had not proved how, if at all, 
specialists were paid—the case was distinguishable from Market 
Street, which held that specialists were fiduciaries of their 
customers.207 
 
 203. See id. at 540–42. 
 204. Id. at 541–42; see also Colesanti, supra note 23, at 28–29 (noting the Finnerty 
court’s frustration on this matter). 
 205. See Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 543–44 & n.10 (citing Hunt, 2006 WL 
2613754, at *6). 
 206. See id. at 543–44 (citing Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at *6). 
 207. See id. at 544 n.10 (citing Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at *6). 
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The last judicial opinion on interpositioning came with the appeal 
of the Finnerty II decision to the Second Circuit, Finnerty III.208  In 
Finnerty III, the Second Circuit approached a narrowed argument, 
for the government no longer attempted to argue fiduciary duty.209  
Rather, the government argued only that Finnerty’s actions were 
deceptive and that the evidence at trial proved this.210  The Second 
Circuit ruled that there was insufficient evidence to show that 
Finnerty had personally misled anyone.211  In passing, the court stated 
that it seemed that the government had proven some manner of theft 
by Finnerty but that without a showing of fiduciary duty, there could 
be no fraud in that.212  The court suggested that conduct, such as theft, 
could be deceptive, but only rose to the level of fraud if there were a 
breach of fiduciary duty accompanying the theft.213  The court ended 
with two points.  First, the government could not prove a violation of 
customer expectations by pointing to the rules of the NYSE and 
stating that Finnerty violated those; there had to be some deception 
emanating from Finnerty himself.214  Second, the government could 
not argue that a violation of exchange rules was a violation of the 
securities laws.215 
B. The Counter-Argument 
As noted above, the government gave up the argument that 
specialists owed a fiduciary duty by the time the Finnerty case got to 
 
 208. See Finnerty III, 533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008).  This decision was quickly copied 
and pasted to overturn the convictions of two other specialists who had been 
convicted. See United States v. Hayward, 284 F. App’x 857, 858 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 209. Reply Brief for the United States of America at 22, Finnerty III, 533 F.3d 143 
(2d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1104-CR), 2008 WL 6610969. 
 210. Id. at 10–27. 
 211. See Finnerty III, 533 F.3d at 149. 
 212. See id. at 148 (citing In re Refco Capital Mkts., Ltd. Brokerage Customer Sec. 
Litig., No. 06 Civ. 643(GEL), 2007 WL 2694469, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2007)).  
Refco Capital, in turn, cited SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 823 (2002) (citing 
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (noting that purchases of 
securities that show a breach of fiduciary duty and are undisclosed to the principal 
are fraud and therefore deceptive)). See also supra Part I.C. 
 213. See Finnerty III, 533 F.3d at 148 (citing Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. 
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158-59 (2008); Refco Capital, 2007 WL 2694469, 
at *8). 
 214. Id. at 149–50 (citing Lattanzio v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 476 F.3d 147 (2d 
Cir. 2007)). 
 215. Id. at 150–51 (citing Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 
(2d Cir. 1971)). 
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the Second Circuit.216  At the trial stage, the government had argued 
that specialists did owe a duty to their public customers.217  The 
government tried to argue that specialists owed a duty of best 
execution to their customers.218  Specialists have the same duties as 
brokers and, therefore, specialists owe a duty of best execution: to 
obtain the best possible price for their customers.219  Therefore, a 
specialist’s failure to disclose her failure to get the best price for her 
customer was a violation of Rule 10b-5.220  The government similarly 
argued that interpositioning was a fraudulent scheme, and therefore a 
violation of Rule 10b-5 subsections (a) and (c).221 
Even before the issue went to the federal courts, the SEC found 
that interpositioning had violated Rule 10b-5.222  Unfortunately, as 
these were settlement proceedings,223 the SEC did not undertake 
 
 216. See Reply Brief, supra note 209, at 22. 
 217. See Government Memorandum in Hunt, supra note 176, at 13–15.  The 
government argued that specialists have a fiduciary duty to their public customers in 
an identical way in all of the specialist prosecutions. C.f, e.g., Government’s 
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Pretrial Motions at 14–17, 
Finnerty I, Nos. 05 Cr. 393 (DC), 05 Cr. 397 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2006), 2006 WL 
4793068. 
 218. See, e.g., Government Memorandum in Hunt, supra note 176, at 13–15 (citing 
Newton v. Merrill Lynch Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1998) (en 
banc); Mkt. St. Ltd. Partners v. Englander Capital Corp., 1993 WL 212817, at *9 
(S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1993)). 
 219. See, e.g., id. 
 220. See, e.g., id. at 15–16 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 
(1980)).  The distinction between an ordinary breach of fiduciary duty and a violation 
of Rule 10b-5 was that the latter was deceptive. See, e.g., id. at 18. 
 221. See, e.g., id. at 11–12. 
 222. E.g., Fleet Specialist, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-49499, 82 SEC 
Docket 1895, at *2, 8 (Mar. 30, 2004); Van Der Moolen Specialists USA, LLC, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-49,502, 82 SEC Docket 1920, at *2, 7–8 (Mar. 30, 
2004), 2005 WL 626564. 
 223. E.g., Fleet Specialist, Inc., 82 SEC Docket 1895, at *1 n.1 (“The findings 
herein are made pursuant to [Fleet Street’s settlement] Offer and are not binding on 
any other person or entity in this or any other proceeding.”); Van Der Moolen 
Specialists USA, LLC, 83 S.E.C. Docket 2366, at *1 n.1 (“The findings herein are 
made pursuant to [Van Der Moolen’s settlement] Offer and are not binding on any 
other person or entity in this or any other proceeding.”).  The SEC has the power to 
settle cases before they reach final adjudication before an administrative law judge; 
these settlements produce opinions called Consent Judgments. See U.S. S.E.C. v. 
Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 161–62 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing U.S. S.E.C. v. 
Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)) (discussing 
the practice of the SEC to settle the majority of its administrative adjudications).  In 
Consent Judgments, the party charged neither admits nor denies wrongdoing, but 
agrees to pay a stiff fine. Id.  Regardless of what the SEC says may have happened, 
the party charged does not admit anything, and the decision is not binding on any 
other party; hence, these Consent Judgments have no precedential value. See id. 
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much of a legal analysis of the situation.  The NYSE undertook a 
similar action and also found a violation of Rule 10b-5.224  The SEC 
and the NYSE found deception, and thus fraud, in the actions of 
specialists being the lynch pin of a Rule 10b-5 violation by stating: 
[s]pecialists impliedly represent to their customers that they are 
dealing fairly with the public in accordance with the standards and 
practices applicable to specialists, namely, that they are limiting 
their dealer transactions to those “reasonably necessary to maintain 
a fair and orderly market.”  A specialist’s failure to comply with this 
implied representation, if done with scienter, can constitute a 
violation of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.225 
There was no mention of fiduciary duty in these decisions. 
Some commentators have agreed that specialists are fiduciaries of 
their customers.  A student note predating the interpositioning 
prosecutions states that when a specialist is trading on behalf of a 
customer, she has a fiduciary duty to that customer.226  Another 
commentator suggests that the government’s case “exhibited a few 
prosecutorial shortcuts and presumptions,” and simply failed to show 
deception.227  Nevertheless, he notes that “the [s]pecialist as agent 
broker would still arguably owe a fiduciary duty to the public 
customer.”228 
Finally, in an ongoing class action against specialists, the Southern 
District of New York suggested that knowledge by specialist firms of 
their employees’ interpositioning was sufficient to show scienter on 
 
 224. Bear Wagner, Inc., New York Stock Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 04-51, 
¶¶ 5, 38, 40, 42 (Mar. 29, 2004), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/04-051.pdf. 
 225. Fleet Specialist, Inc., 2004 WL 626580, at *8 (citing Newton v. Merrill Lynch 
Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc); Mkt. St. Ltd. 
Partners v. Englander Capital Corp., No. 92 CIV. 7434 (LMM), 1993 WL 212817 
(S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1993)); Van Der Moolen Specialists USA, LLC, Exchange Act 
Release No. 49502, 2004 WL 626564, at *8 (Mar. 30, 2004) (citing the same sources); 
Bear Wagner, Inc., New York Stock Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 04-51, ¶ 40 
(citing the same sources).  All three of these sources have the same paragraph, 
verbatim.  For a discussion of why the SEC’s view that interpositioning constituted 
fraud because it entailed deception was not accorded any deference, see supra note 
60. 
 226. See Note, supra note 121, at 697.  This discussion, nevertheless, was not about 
interpositioning, but rather about the ability of specialists to engage in old-fashioned 
insider trading because of their greater access to corporate inside information, due to 
their positions as traders of those companies’ stocks. See id. at 697–99. 
 227. See Colesanti, supra note 23, at 27. 
 228. See id. at 26 (citing Mkt. St., 1993 WL 212817, at *31, 33). 
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the part of the firms.229  The court added also that the clients of the 
specialists could rely on “honesty and integrity of the NYSE.”230  Only 
time will tell whether the class is able to prove that the specialists 
committed fraud by interpositioning231—unless there is a settlement 
before that, which is likely as settlement negotiations are ongoing.232  
The class does not appear to be arguing that the specialists had any 
fiduciary duties to the class, as agents of the class. 
III.  WHO’S RIGHT? 
The outcome of the specialist prosecutions appears to be based on 
a misunderstanding of the law of agency.233  Yet, the courts’ mistakes 
can be excused by the incomplete analysis of fiduciary duty given by 
the prosecution, who did not deal with the nuance that specialists’ 
fiduciary duties are multi-dimensional.  Specifically, specialists have a 
duty to get their customers the best price, but do not have a duty to 
constantly update them with information.234  Thus, the courts could be 
excused for taking the absence of one fiduciary duty to mean the total 
absence of all fiduciary duties.235 
A. Economic Analysis for Legal Realism 
Returning to the ideas of Professor Fuller, discussed in Part I.F,236 
what is the economic nature of interpositioning?  Is it a problem of 
the same kind that Rule 10b-5 exists to prevent, or is it merely 
beneficent arbitrage?  To answer this question, it is useful to consider 
what sort of economic problem Rule 10b-5 has been shown to 
address. 
 
 229. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 405 F. Supp. 2d 281, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), 
rev’d on other grounds, 503 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007); see NYSE Specialists, 260 F.R.D. 
at 75 (noting that the lead plaintiff may be able “to identify the Specialist Firms’ 
illegal conduct in a uniform manner and can be used to determine whether illegal 
conduct occurred without necessitating a trade-by-trade review”). 
 230. NYSE Specialists, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 319. 
 231. Cf. Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d 530, 538–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing the 
government’s failure to prove fraud), aff’d, 533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 232. See supra note 66. 
 233. See Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1999); supra 
notes 130–133 and accompanying text. 
 234. See supra notes 130–133 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra notes 130–133 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra notes 153–156 and accompanying text. 
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Rule 10b-5 combats fraud in connection with the sale or purchase 
of a security.237  Fraud, as discussed above, generally takes the shape 
of swindling someone.238  Because there is an assumption that an 
agent acts loyally to the principal, a disloyal agent is tacitly 
deceptive.239  The disloyal action is usually done to make profit from 
the agent’s position, without the consent of the principal.240  Profit 
comes from information: first, one may fail to tell the principal of 
some chance to make a profit (these are the secret profit and 
corporate opportunity doctrines,241 and both are easily applied to 
classical insider trading242); second, one may use some confidence of 
the principal without the principal’s consent, usually this confidence is 
about a transaction that shall take place at a given price (the 
misappropriation theory variety of insider trading falls into this 
category243 as does trading ahead244). 
In either of the above cases, the information relates to a 
transaction that was not produced by the agent; it was already taking 
place.  Rather, the agent was free-riding on this transaction in one of 
two ways.  First, an opportunity was going to the principal because of 
the nature of the principal’s position and the agent decided to take it 
for herself.245  Or second, the principal had already decided to act, and 
 
 237. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 238. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 240. See supra notes 78–79, 137–140 and accompanying text. 
 241. See supra notes 137–139 and accompanying text. 
 242. See supra notes 107–109 and accompanying text. 
 243. See supra notes 140, 110–116 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra notes 92•98 and accompanying text. 
 245. See supra notes 241–242 and accompanying text.  A potential difficulty arises 
with the Secret Profits doctrine, since the doctrine extends to all activities of an agent 
that arise as a result of its employment with the principal. See Reading v. The King, 
(1948) 2 K.B. 268, 275 (U.K.) (“It matters not that the master has not lost any profit, 
nor suffered any damage.  Nor does it matter that the master could not have done the 
act himself.  It is a case where the servant unjustly enriched himself by virtue of his 
service without the master’s sanction.”).  Thus, these may include potentially new 
activities that the principal might not have done on his own. See id.  However, the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty does not have to deal with only one problem; rather, it can 
deal with multiple problems, as any legal doctrine. Cf. Fuller, supra note 153, at 800–
04 (listing the various functions that the doctrine of consideration fulfills).  Still, one 
easy example of the secret profits rule is when a broker refuses to report to his 
principal a commission that he is receiving while watching the principal’s property. 
See, e.g., Little v. Phipps, 94 N.E. 260, 260–62 (Mass. 1911).  In such a case, the 
commission would have come to someone; the agent merely captured it, or redirected 
it from the principal. See id. 
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the agent made an incidental profit.246  In both of these cases, the 
agent has added no value but merely profited from an existing 
productive activity brought about by the principal.  The agent’s 
income is economic rent, just as Ricardo described it, when he said 
that to extract rent is to profit from the timber that grows in Norway 
that would grow regardless of who, if anyone, owned the land.247  In 
other words, the profit to the agent is not necessary for the activity to 
take place, but the agent profits from it anyway.248 
Thus, one of the functions of the fiduciary duty of loyalty is to 
prevent agents from extracting rent from their principals—unless, of 
course, this is part of the bargain.249  Fraud, among other things, is the 
violation of this duty.250  So, fraud from the violation of the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty is rent-seeking, and the profit from the fraud is 
extracted rent.  So the problem that Rule 10b-5 addresses is rent-
seeking in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.251 
So, what then of interpositioning?  Interpositioning has been called 
arbitrage,252 and arbitrage is generally a good thing.253  But 
interpositioning is not arbitrage.  By definition, arbitrage requires one 
to find price discrepancies in different markets and then perform the 
socially useful task of bringing those prices into line with one 
another.254  Specialists, on the other hand, do not search out price 
discrepancies; rather, the price discrepancies come to them without 
any effort on their part.255 
When one retains income for something that happens naturally, or 
at least without input on the part of the one retaining the income, that 
is called rent.256  Specialists are already compensated for their work by 
receiving commissions.257  The nature of a rent is such that if it were 
eliminated, the factor that took it would continue to exist,258 like the 
 
 246. See supra notes 243–244 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra notes 161–164 and accompanying text. 
 248. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 249. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 250. See supra notes 238–240 and accompanying text. 
 251. See supra notes 69, 249–250 and accompanying text. 
 252. Finnerty III, 533 F.3d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 253. See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text. 
 255. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra notes 162–164 and accompanying text. 
 257. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 258. See supra notes 162–164 and accompanying text. 
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“original and indestructible powers” of the land.259  This wealth 
transfer from traders to specialists is not socially useful because it 
incentivizes customers to spend extra time and resources figuring out 
what they by definition do not know: the price closest to what a 
counterparty might offer or bid, rather than putting those resources 
into some other form of wealth creation.260 
One might argue that specialists have always understood that part 
of their income to be interpositioning income and that indeed this is 
what makes a firm agree to such an arrangement with an exchange.261  
But one cannot agree to something that one does not know occurs, 
and since no one had sued the specialists’ firms before the SEC 
uncovered interpositioning, customers were simply not aware of 
interpositioning.262  Furthermore, how could customers collectively 
agree to ignore the Rules of the NYSE?263  More importantly, the 
existence of the opportunity to profit from rent income in this 
manner, encourages more entrants into the market than would 
otherwise be efficient.264  In other words, financial firms’ resources, 
instead of producing wealth, are extracting wealth transfers from the 
customers of exchanges.265  Hence, interpositioning is the extraction of 
economic rent, and this is precisely the sort of activity that Rule 10b-5 
exists to prevent. 
B. Mistakes in the Law and a Fact: Fiduciary Duty, Fraud, and 
Rule 10b-5 
The chief flaw in the courts’ analyses is that they give short shrift to 
the issue of fiduciary duty.266  Their reasoning proceeded as follows: 
 
 259. RICARDO, supra note 162, at 34. 
 260. Cf. Tullock, supra note 165, at 229•31. 
 261. Cf. Krueger, supra note 166, at 292–93 (discussing the fact that bribes paid to 
public servants may be part of the enticement to become public servants).  
Remember the exasperation of the court in Finnerty II about its ignorance of the 
implied transaction between customers and specialists. See supra note 204 and 
accompanying text. 
 262. Witness the fact that only one lawsuit was brought by the public against 
specialists for interpositioning, and only after the SEC uncovered this practice. See In 
re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2007); Lucchetti & Scannell, 
supra note 48, at C1. 
 263. The Rules of the NYSE prohibited interpositioning. See supra note 36. 
 264. See Krueger, supra note 166, at 292 (explaining that the existence of rent 
income in the form of quasi-monopoly profits from import licenses creates a larger 
number of import firms than is socially useful). 
 265. Cf. id. 
 266. See supra notes 191–197, 205–207 and accompanying text. 
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for want of fiduciary duty, there was no fraud;267 for want of fraud, 
there was no deception;268 for want of deception, there was no 
violation of Rule 10b-5269—all for the want of fiduciary duty. 
The courts made three basic errors with the issue of fiduciary duty.  
First, the courts incorrectly believed that specialists did not receive a 
commission from their customers and therefore, were not agents.270  
This analysis erred in two respects.  First, specialists are paid, if not 
directly by customers, then as employees of specialists’ firms that 
receive part of the commission for trades that go through them.271  
Second, compensation is not a necessary condition of agency.272  
Agency is an agreement between the principal and the agent that the 
latter will act under the control of the former.273  When a customer 
orders a broker to buy at a certain price and that broker orders the 
specialist to do so, that is control by a customer.  It appears that the 
reason the courts, particularly that of Hunt, made such a lunge at the 
payment factor was because that was a way to distinguish 
uncomfortable precedent.274  But then, payment was not a deciding 
factor in Market Street; in that court’s rationale, the term 
‘commission’ only appeared in an explanatory parenthetical quote.275  
Therefore, the Hunt court erred, as did the courts that cited it,276 when 
it said that because specialists were not paid by their customers—
which was not true in the first place—specialists could not be their 
agents. 
 
 267. See supra notes 212–213 and accompanying text.  For a more accurate 
discussion of the relation of fiduciary duty and fraud, see supra notes 75–79 and 
accompanying text. 
 268. See supra note 183–184 and accompanying text. 
 269. See Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d 530, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Thus, the very 
core of the federal securities laws in question is the premise that there must be some 
form of deception.”), aff’d, 533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 270. See supra notes 38–40, 197, 207 and accompanying text. 
 271. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.  If specialist firms are agents of 
the customers, and specialists are agents of the firms, then specialists are subagents of 
the customers, and therefore owe to the customers the same duties as other agents 
would. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.15(1) (2006). 
 272. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 273. See id. 
 274. See supra notes 197, 207 and accompanying text. 
 275. See Mkt. St. Ltd. Partners v. Englander Capital Corp., No. 92 CIV. 7434 
(LMM), 1993 WL 212817, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1993) (quoting Note, supra note 
121, at 697). 
 276. See supra notes 205–207 and accompanying text. 
ASUDULAYEV_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2013  7:26 PM 
950 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
The second, more interesting and bizarre error by the Hunt court 
was the torsion of New York law on the fiduciary duties of brokers.277  
Accepting arguendo that Market Street was correct in equating the 
duties of a specialist to those of a broker, the Hunt court bizarrely 
ruled that brokers do not have any fiduciary duties to their customers 
anyway.278  On the one hand, it suggested that it was applying Market 
Street by accepting its analogy of specialists to brokers, but refused to 
accept its resultant conclusion that because brokers had a fiduciary 
duty to their customers, so too did specialists, which was the whole 
point of the analogy.279  It is not clear why the Hunt court did not 
explicitly disagree with Market Street but chose to apply it in this 
strange way. 
On the other hand, the Hunt court was plainly misled when it 
noted that brokers had no fiduciary duties to their customers.  
Brokers do have a narrow fiduciary duty to their customers, with 
regard to specific transactions: the duty of best execution.280  The 
cases that the Hunt court cited stood for the proposition that where a 
broker had bought a security on behalf of a buyer, that broker did not 
owe that buyer a duty to keep her informed about price changes in 
that security.281  None of those cases actually supported the idea that a 
broker did not need to get the best possible price for her customer-
buyer, even to the detriment of the broker.  Perhaps this is why none 
of the other specialist prosecution cases went quite as far as Hunt in 
that regard.  Thus, it must be accepted that brokers do owe a 
fiduciary duty of best execution to their customers,282 and therefore, 
specialists also owe this fiduciary duty to their customers.283 
Yet, the third and most interesting error with the specialist 
prosecution cases was the issue of dual principality: that specialists, 
even if they were agents, would have two adversely positioned 
principals and that therefore, they would be unable to act as their 
agents.284  One suspects that that in the back of their minds neither the 
courts nor, perhaps, even the government really wanted to deal with 
the seemingly complex question of what the duties of a specialist are 
 
 277. See supra notes 191–192 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra notes 191–194 and accompanying text. 
 279. See Mkt. St., 1993 WL 212817, at *9 (quoting Note, supra note 121, at 697). 
 280. See supra notes 127–133 and accompanying text. 
 281. See id. 
 282. See supra Part I.E.1. 
 283. See Mkt. St., 1993 WL 212817, at *9 (quoting Note, supra note 121, at 697). 
 284. See supra notes 195–196, 206 and accompanying text. 
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when a specialist must act in the best interest of two parties who are 
on opposite sides of a transaction.  The difficulty was illusory. 
An agent may act on behalf of two adversely positioned principals, 
as long as both principals are informed of this arrangement.285  There 
might appear to be difficulty in the agent’s need to disclose 
information “that the agent knows, has reason to know, or should 
know would reasonably affect the principal’s judgment.”286  And, 
moreover, it is true that an agent whose duty of confidentiality to one 
principal prevents her from disclosing such information to another 
principal has a duty to resign her post.287  Nevertheless, courts have 
held that an agent acting for two otherwise adverse parties is not 
required to communicate those two parties’ reservation prices nor 
resign because the agent cannot communicate them.288  But, where an 
agent has two principals, she has the duty of informing the adverse 
parties in a transaction of each other’s actual offers and cannot profit 
from their ignorance of each other’s offers.289  This is precisely what 
specialists do.290  Indeed, were one to exchange Finnerty for the 
broker in Jerlyn Yacht Sales, Finnerty would have been found both a 
fiduciary and in violation of his duty to disclose.291 
A final correction to Hunt is that what the court thought was 
circular—disclosure as the sole duty of a fiduciary292—is not actually 
circular.  The confusion stems from the rule that breaches of the duty 
of loyalty always create a duty to disclose the breach.293  The full duty 
of a specialist, then, was either not to engage in interpositioning, by 
either setting the transaction in securities at either the price of the bid 
or the price of the offer, or by warning her customers that she would 
interposition.294  This way, either there would be no interposition, or 
 
 285. See supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text. 
 286. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06(2)(b)(ii) (2006). 
 287. See id. § 8.06 cmt. d(2). 
 288. See supra notes 145–148 and accompanying text. 
 289. Jerlyn Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Wayne R. Roman Yacht Brokerage, 950 F.2d 60, 67 
(1st Cir. 1991).  See infra Part III.D for a discussion of how specialists’ duties interact 
with Rule 10b-5 and § 10(b). 
 290. See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
 291. Compare supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text (discussing 
interpositioning), with supra notes 149–152 and accompanying text (discussing the 
duties of a broker between two principals, a buyer and seller with regard to the Jerlyn 
Yacht Sale case). 
 292. United States v. Hunt, No. 05 CR. 395(DAB), 2006 WL 2613754, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006) (discussing the government’s “puzzlingly circular” theory). 
 293. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06. 
 294. See id. 
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the customers would be able to take into account the interpositioning 
and make bids and offers that at least took interpositioning into 
account.295 
C. And All of the Analogies: Insider Trading and Trading 
Ahead 
What makes the courts’ decisions so hard to accept is that close 
analogies to interpositioning abound, and yet go unnoticed by the 
courts.296  Interpositioning resembles other fairly standard forms of 
fraud: modern federal law on insider trading states that a fiduciary of 
a party that is either acquiring or being acquired in a merger and 
acquisition has the duty not to trade on the stock of the acquisition 
target, if the information of the future acquisition is not public.297  
Specialists also have information that is non-public: the bids and 
offers of the different customers for a security.298  Reflection on the 
scenario of O’Hagan drives the point home.  O’Hagan essentially 
interposed himself between the buyer of an asset and the seller.  He 
knew that the buyer was going to buy a security, at some price higher 
than the market price, which was non-public information, and he took 
advantage of this non-public information to make money on the 
spread between the current market price and the non-public higher 
acquisition price.299  Interpositioning is precisely that—making a profit 
from the spread between bid and offer prices that are non-public and 
known only by the specialist because of his fiduciary relationship to 
the customer.300  In other words, interpositioning looks like a 
straightforward case of O’Hagan-style misappropriation.  And this 
form of misappropriation fits in neatly with the fiduciary duty not to 
profit from the principal’s property—given that information is a form 
of property.301 
 
 295. See id. 
 296. This is, of course, in addition to the similar economic natures of normal 10b-5 
fraud and interpositioning, discussed supra Part III.A. 
 297. These are the classical and misappropriation theories of insider trading, 
respectively. See supra notes 106–109 and accompanying text. 
 298. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.  If bids and offers sent to 
specialists were public, specialists would not be able to interposition, since buyers and 
sellers would change their orders, in an attempt to capture as much of the difference 
between the bids and offers as possible. 
 299. See supra notes 112–116 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra notes 140–141 and accompanying text. 
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Similarly, interpositioning could be made to look like a classical 
form of insider trading by shifting the focus to the seller of the asset, 
whose lack of knowledge about an impending purchase by an 
acquirer leads her to sell her asset to the insider and lose the ability to 
sell her asset later at a higher price.302  Moreover, interpositioning is 
open to another form of fiduciary duty analysis: the secret profits and 
opportunity doctrines.  The secret profits and opportunity doctrines 
are, essentially, that an agent is not to derive economic rent from her 
position of employment.303  And given that interpositioning is 
essentially a rent,304 it is well within the prohibition of the secret 
profits doctrine.305 
Lastly, one should consider the similarities between trading ahead, 
which is fraud,306 and interpositioning.307  Trading ahead is to buy a 
security knowing that one’s customer is going to buy it—that is, 
guaranteeing oneself an asset whose price is set to rise (if the broker 
buys it before the customer’s order is executed).308  Interpositioning 
only differs in that, rather than holding onto the security, one simply 
sells it off to a guaranteed buyer, thus making money from the buyer 
directly, by sale, rather than indirectly, by allowing the buyer’s latter 
purchase to push up prices.309  The harm to the final buyer of the 
security is the same: in both cases, a buyer gets not the price that the 
market (or another offeror) is offering, but a higher price, while the 
broker or specialist benefits from being able to have someone else 
buy a security that creates value for her, either directly or indirectly.310  
The differences between interpositioning and what happened in Dial 
are inapposite, since trading ahead is still a breach of the duty of best 
 
 302. See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text. 
 303. See supra notes 137–141, 162–164 and accompanying text.  To make money 
from a third party without actually doing anything except occupying the position of 
the principal’s agent is a textbook example of economic rent. See supra notes 162–
164 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra Part III.A. 
 305. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.  It is worthwhile to note in the 
Jerlyn Yacht Sales case the fiduciary duty discussed was that relating to secret profits. 
See Jerlyn Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Wayne R. Roman Yacht Brokerage, 950 F.2d 60, 69 
(1st Cir. 1991). 
 306. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
 307. See Daniel A. Klein, Annotation, Prosecution Based on Interpositioning, 
Trading Ahead, or Front Running in Connection with Securities Transaction, 56 
A.L.R. FED. 2d 619 § 6 (2011). 
 308. See supra notes 84–85, 88–90 and accompanying text. 
 309. See supra note 99. 
 310. Compare supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text, with supra notes 84–90 
and accompanying text. 
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execution, regardless of whether the broker solicits orders or 
passively takes them.311  Since trading ahead is fraud,312 so too is 
interpositioning. 
D. Of Missing Steps and Synthesis 
Of all the specialist prosecution cases, the most complete—if 
erroneous—analysis of specialists’ fiduciary duty was that in Hunt.313  
There the court, perhaps, came quite close to finding the flaw in the 
government’s case: “[Rule 10b-5] liability is premised upon a duty to 
disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between 
parties to a transaction.”314  The government’s argument boiled down 
to this, since specialists owed a duty to get their customers the best 
price, they breached this duty by interpositioning, and the failure to 
disclose this breach was a fraud.315  The Hunt court believed this 
argument to be circular: how could the sole fiduciary duty of a broker 
be to disclose its own breach of its fiduciary duty?  The Hunt court all 
but said that a mere breach of a fiduciary duty is not securities fraud, 
unless it is a breach of a duty to disclose.316  This is true, of course: 
only breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty are fraudulent for the 
purposes of Rule 10b-5; one must either forgo the breaching activity 
or disclose its nature to the principal.317  Breaches of the fiduciary 
duty of care, on the other hand, do not rise to the level of fraud.318 
The Hunt court’s discussion of broker’s fiduciary duty was 
erroneous.319  The Hunt court’s authorities for its view320 stated 
something quite close to the proposition that brokers had no duties of 
 
 311. Compare United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 1985), with Newton 
v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 270 (3d Cir. 1998) (en 
banc), and Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs.Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 312. See supra Part I.D.1. 
 313. See supra notes 191–197, 205–207 and accompanying text. 
 314. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980). 
 315. See Government Memorandum in Hunt, supra note 176, at 14, 16 (citations 
omitted). 
 316. See id. 
 317. Compare Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 (“[Rule 10b-5] liability is premised upon a 
duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to 
a transaction.”), with Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977) (noting 
that the lower court’s extension of breach of fiduciary duty into securities fraud was 
unwarranted). 
 318. See sources cited supra note 317. 
 319. See supra notes 280–281 and accompanying text. 
 320. United States v. Hunt, No. 05 CR. 395(DAB), 2006 WL 2613754, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006). 
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disclosure to their clients, which would have worked to take broker 
breaches of fiduciary duty—whatever those duties might be—out of 
Rule 10b-5.  For it has been said that a broker owes no duty to a 
normal customer to disclose information about the movements of a 
stock, unless that broker is charged with managing that stock.321  So 
perhaps the Hunt court was groping for the following argument: if 
brokers owe no disclosure duty to their clients,322 and specialists owe 
the same duties as brokers,323 then specialists, too, have no disclosure 
duty, and therefore cannot violate Rule 10b-5 through breach of 
fiduciary duty, since the only fiduciary duty whose violation is a fraud 
for Rule 10b-5 is that of the fiduciary duty to disclose.324 
This argument is plausible, and it is the best argument that the 
Hunt court and the courts that cited Hunt could have used.325  But this 
argument is incorrect for the simple reason that the disclosure duty 
that the De Kwiatkowski court had in mind was the fiduciary duty of 
reasonable care: to disclose to the client information about the stock 
that the client would not otherwise know.326  There was no mention of 
a duty of loyalty, which is a duty to disclose potentially lucrative 
business opportunities.327  Similarly, the other cases that discuss the 
duties of brokers pinpoint the scope of duty to the execution of the 
trade, but do not limit the duty of loyalty therein.328  The duty of 
loyalty, on the other hand, always carries with it a duty to disclose.329  
 
 321. De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 306 F.3d 1293, 1307–08 (2d Cir. 
2002) (citing Caravan Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 769 
F.2d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 1995); Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 
F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D. Mich. 1978), aff’d, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981); Robbinson v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 107, 112 (N.D. Ala. 1971), 
aff’d, 453 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1972); Puckett v. Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., 
587 So. 2d 273, 280 (Miss. 1991)). 
 322. See id. 
 323. Mkt. St. Ltd. Partners v. Englander Capital Corp., No. 92 CIV. 7434 (LMM), 
1993 WL 212817, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1993) (citing Note, supra note 121, at 697). 
 324. Compare Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (“[Rule 10b-5] 
liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and 
confidence between parties to a transaction.”), with Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 
430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977) (noting that the lower court’s extension of breach of 
fiduciary duty into securities fraud was unwarranted). 
 325. See, e.g., Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d 530, 533–34 & n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(citing Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at *6). 
 326. See De Kwiatkowski, 306 F.3d at 1307–08. 
 327. See supra notes 137–141 and accompanying text. 
 328. See, e.g., Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(noting the limited scope of fiduciary duty while reconciling New York state cases on 
the topic). 
 329. See supra note 137–143 and accompanying text. 
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Like any broker must, every specialist must do everything possible so 
that her customer gets the best possible execution of an order.330  This 
entails disclosing to the customer the identity of the principal,331 all 
the information that is relevant for the principal to make an informed 
decision about that order, which includes the opportunity332 that the 
specialist would take to interpose herself between both customers, 
and take away from them the potential benefit of their bargain.333 
Insider trading and trading ahead are both violations of the duty of 
loyalty by agents because those agents use the informational property 
of their principals, without the principals’ knowledge, to profit 
themselves.334  That interpositioning is similar to a violation of the 
duty of loyalty is clear from the analogous nature of interpositioning 
to both trading ahead and insider trading.335  Therefore, 
interpositioning is a violation of the duty of loyalty (which is the duty 
of disclosure), like insider trading,336 and the failure to disclose 
matures to a violation of Rule 10b-5 and Section 10(b).337  As such, 
interpositioning must take its place amongst its close analogues as a 
violation of the duty of loyalty, and therefore, a form of fraud, which, 
in connection with a purchase or sale of a security, is a violation of 
Rule 10b-5. 
 
 330. See supra Part I.E.I. 
 331. See supra Part I.E.1. 
 332. See supra Part I.E.2. 
 333. See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
 334. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.05 & cmt. c, 8.06(1)(a)(2) 
(noting that “it is a breach of an agent’s duty to use confidential information of the 
principal for the purpose of effecting trades in securities although the agent does not 
reveal the information in the course of trading” and that to avoid a breach of 
fiduciary duty an agent must obtain the principal’s consent forth use of the principal’s 
information and “disclose[] all material facts that the agent knows, has reason to 
know, or should know would reasonably affect the principal’s judgment unless the 
principal has manifested that such facts are already known by the principal or that 
the principal does not wish to know them”), with United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 
642, 652 (1997) (noting that it is a “fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of a 
principal’s information to purchase or sell securities” that is fraud), and United States 
v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[F]raud [is] to fail to ‘level’ with one to 
whom one owes fiduciary duties.”). 
 335. See supra Part III.C. 
 336. See, e.g., O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. 
 337. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).  Perhaps it is time that the 
Court updated Chiarella to hold explicitly, rather than implicitly, that a violation of a 
duty of loyalty, in connection with a sale or purchase of a security, is always a fraud in 
violation of Rule 10b-5 because all duties of loyalty carry with them duties of 
disclosure. See supra notes 329–337 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
Interpositioning is a somewhat complicated procedure, and when 
combined with a poorly-researched—or perhaps not meticulously-
researched—set of arguments, it is quite possible that the wrong legal 
result may occur: a court might incorrectly decide that specialists are 
not fiduciaries, do not owe a fiduciary duty, and therefore cannot 
deceive without making an affirmative representation that is contrary 
to fact, and thus a court would then find no fraud in the actions of a 
specialist who interpositions.338  But specialists are fiduciaries, despite 
the fact that they each serve two principals,339 and indeed they would 
remain fiduciaries even if they were not paid for their troubles—
which they are.340  And because specialists are fiduciaries, their quiet 
reaping of profits by interpositioning does amount to deception.341  
Because interpositioning is the extraction of economic rent, rather 
than something socially useful, such as true arbitrage, it is the sort of 
problem that Rule 10b-5 exists to combat.342  Because specialists fit 
snugly into the shoes of agents,343 while their interpositioning fits 
snugly into the rubrics of breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty,344 it 
appears that the courts that were given the task of judging the 
specialist prosecution cases came out with the wrong results.345  
Perhaps, as one commentator has suggested, courts might simply not 
be well designed to sit in judgment over complex financial matters, 
within complex financial regulatory systems.346  On the other hand, if 
the present class action347 does not settle before it gets to the merits, 
there is some hope of the courts setting the law straight and ruling 
that specialists who interpose violate their fiduciary duties of loyalty 
and thereby commit fraud, punishable by Rule 10b-5 and Section 
10(b). 
It may be that the interpositioning criminal cases are decided and 
that the civil case will settle before any court has a chance to correct 
its views, but what this analysis of the interpositioning prosecutions 
 
 338. See supra notes 266–269 and accompanying text. 
 339. See supra notes 285–289 and accompanying text. 
 340. See supra notes 271–273 and accompanying text. 
 341. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text. 
 342. See supra Part III.A. 
 343. See supra Part III.B. 
 344. See supra Part III.C. 
 345. See supra Parts III.B, III.D. 
 346. Bove, supra note 44, at 1386. 
 347. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 260 F.R.D. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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has shown is that the various forms of fraud in finance all share a 
common theme, be it interpositioning, insider trading, or trading 
ahead: using the trust that a principal (a customer or a large 
commercial enterprise) might give a professional (the specialist, or 
the trader), the professional receives a benefit that is really just the 
exploitation of an opportunity that should have been reserved for the 
principal.348  Surely, this is a cancer upon the financial system, about 
which the legal system must remain ever-vigilant. 
 
 348. See supra Part III.D. 
